F-4 Phantom II. Part 3: USN & USMC Versions by Bert Kinzey

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Cyber Triad capability can consist of Regular defence/military assets and networks as forming the first section of the triad; the second section of the triad can consist of an isolated conglomerate of air-gapped networks situated across the friendly nations as part of cooperative defence, which can be initiated as credible second strike option; and the third section of the triad can consist of a loosely connected network of cyber militia involving patriotic hackers, commercial white hats and private contractors which can be initiated after the initial strike or in case of early warning of a potential strike.

To develop the desired theory, this paper systematically addresses five key areas. First, the paper defines the key terms that are associated with cyber issues. Particular emphasis is placed on the terms “cyberspace”, “cyberpower”, and “cyberstrategy”. Second, the paper categorizes the elements, constituent parts, and factors that yield a framework for thinking about cyberpower. Third, the paper explains the major factors that are driving the evolution of cyberspace and cyberpower. To support that effort, the paper presents strawman principles that characterize major trends.

These observations suggest that the USG might be assuming significant, unknown risks by failing to take a balanced perspective of key cyberspace trends. It also implies the need to undertake more extensive risk assessments to understand the potential “down-side” of key dependencies. H. Starr / Towards an Evolving Theory of Cyberpower 31 Table 1. Military Opportunities & Risks in Cyberspace To begin to deal with these risks, steps should be taken at the strategic, operational, and programmatic levels.