Posted by 
By Stephen Blackwell
This booklet examines why the govt led via Harold Macmillan remained able to use army strength to prop up the regime of King Hussein. Blackwell presents new ancient insights into the origins of the Anglo-American use of army energy to guard their pursuits within the center East. creation : Jordan, Suez and the decline of British effect within the heart East -- Glubb's Jordan : the Arab legion, the Hashemites and the nationalist problem, 1948-1956 -- Amman less than the shadow of Nasser : Jordanian nationalism and the Suez trouble, April-November 1956 -- The British abandonment and the yankee retrieval of Jordan, November 1956-April 1957 -- The kings opposed to the colonels : Jordan and the Anglo-American plot to overthrow the Syrian govt, 1957 -- fighting Nasser : Anglo-American aid for Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, November 1957-June 1958 -- The Baghdad coup and the Macmillan government's determination to intrude in Jordan, 14-17 July 1958 -- A tenuous foothold : British paratroops set up in Amman, July-August 1958 -- dealing with the overseas problem : making a UN 'mantle' for Jordan, September-November 1958 -- Belated reappraisals : Anglo-American coverage, nearby nationalism and the way forward for Jordan, November 1958-March 1959
Read Online or Download British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955-1958 PDF
Similar middle east books
City of Oranges: Arabs and Jews in Jaffa
Jaffa - famed for its orange groves - was once for hundreds of years a urban of investors, retailers, academics and directors, domestic to Muslims, Christians and Jews alike. that's, till the founding of the kingdom of Israel, which used to be concurrently a second of jubilation for the Jews and a catastrophe - the Naqba - for the 100,000 Arabs who fled Jaffa in 1948.
Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon: The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Triumph of the State
The advanced courting among Syria and Lebanon is the political fulcrum of the center East, and has ruled headlines because the withdrawal of French colonial forces from the Levant in 1943. one of many nice paradoxes of this dating is how such very diversified political structures emerged in what many Syrian and Lebanese humans see as one society.
A History of the Arabian Peninsula
The significance of this assortment lies in its origins: for the 1st time, top Saudi Arabian historians have created a background of the Arabian Peninsula which analyzes that background from an inner Arabian point of view. The e-book explores the unique Bedouin cost of the quarter, the advance of the foremost city components of Arabia through the Umayyad interval, the socio-political and fiscal advancements within the Hijad and Najd as much as the eighteenth century into the fashionable period and the increase and improvement of the Saudi kingdom.
Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the First Years in Power
This is often the 1st significant paintings on Bashar al-Asad. It assesses the sturdiness of his father, Hafiz's legacy together with the continual effect of the previous power-brokers, the effectiveness of Bashar's makes an attempt to maneuver clear of his father's shadow, and the customers for reform. specifically, it evaluates Bashar's carrying on with carry on energy following Syria's humiliating retreat from Lebanon in Spring 2005 and the competitive American force to impose democracy within the heart East.
Extra info for British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955-1958
Sample text
His extensive knowledge of the country was not easy to replace, and the next two British ambassadors, Geoffrey Furlonge and Charles Duke, were to prove to be uncertain custodians of bilateral relations at a time of significant turbulence in Jordan. In comparison with the real affection that Kirkbride had been able to invoke, Furlonge was a failure. 23 In his reportage on the political situation Furlonge affected a careless disregard of the plight of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan while keeping a cautious eye on the inconsequential manifestations of Soviet interest in the country at that time.
General Glubb held a pejorative opinion of the Zionists that was common among those British soldiers who had witnessed the death throes of the Palestine Mandate. He felt that if Israel did not seek some form of lasting peace, the Arabs would one day put aside their differences to ‘wreak a terrible revenge’ on the Jewish state. 28 Glubb nevertheless believed that the Israeli armed forces could destroy the Arab Legion within a matter of days if it came to a direct confl ict. This disparity of strength was brutally exposed by the savage Israeli reprisal raid led by a young officer, Ariel Sharon, on the West Bank village of Qibya on the night of 14 October 1953.
On 11 January 1956, Nasser explained to Humphrey Trevelyan, the British ambassador in Egypt, that he saw the pact as a ruse to isolate Egypt. 62 By this time, however, the wind had been taken out of the sails of the demonstrators by the clampdown of the Arab Legion and a series of hasty political concessions by the monarchy. An initial casualty was the new government led by Ibrahim Hashim, which collapsed on 7 January after only being in power for eighteen days. Following the resignation of Hashim, Hussein asked Samir al-Rifai to take the premiership.